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Abstract  25 
This paper describes a choice experiment (CE) administered to explore farmer preferences for 26 
conservation agreements to conserve rare breeds among a sample of 174 respondents in Transylvania 27 
(Romania). The study site was chosen due to the prevalence of small-scale and extensive farm systems 28 
threatened by a changing policy environment that is increasing the scale and intensity of production 29 
units. Agreement attributes included length of conservation contract (5 or 10 years); scheme structure 30 
(community or individual managed conservation programme), and scheme support (application 31 
assistance or farm advisory support).  A monetary attribute that reflects compensation for scheme 32 
participation allows the assessment of farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) for different contracts. 33 
Results suggest 89% of respondents would be willing to farm with rare breeds; cattle and sheep being 34 
the most popular livestock option; 40% of farmers were reportedly farming with endangered breeds.  35 
However, only 8% were likely to qualify for funding support under current requirements. WTA 36 
estimates reveal minimum annual compensation values of €167 and € 7 per year respectively, for bovine 37 
and ovine farmers to consider enrolling in a contract. These values are comparable to Romanian Rural 38 
Development Programme (RDP) support offered to farmers keeping rare breeds of € 200 and € 10 per 39 
year for bovine and ovine farmers respectively. Our estimates of scheme uptake, calculated with 40 
coefficient values derived from the CE, suggest rare breed conservation contracts are considered 41 
attractive by Romanian farmers. Analysis suggests meeting farmer preferences for non-monetary 42 








1 Introduction  50 
Farm Animal Genetic Resources (FAnGR) diversity underpins resilient agricultural systems and  51 
need to be part of any sustainable intensification (SI) strategy to meet rising demand for livestock 52 
products (Eisler et al., 2014). However, concentration on elite breeding lines has reduced genetic 53 
variation in many commercial breeds whilst marginalising traditional breeds whose value is often 54 
poorly understood (Ahtiainen and Pouta, 2011; FAO, 2015).  55 
 56 
SI strategies should include investments to maintain genetic variation across a range of breeds 57 
(including rare breeds) to ensure adaptive capacity in livestock systems. This is particularly important 58 
when considering profound demographic and environmental changes facing the agri-food sector 59 
including population growth, land scarcity and climate change (FAO, 2017). Equally important, but less 60 
often articulated in decision making, are the cultural and heritage attributes embodied in rare breeds 61 
(Gandini and Villa, 2003; Zander et al., 2013). Markets often fail to reflect these values, which can be 62 
substantial but difficult to measure. Breed genetic diversity is therefore undersupplied by markets and 63 
there is a need to explore policy interventions to counter market failure.  64 
 65 
While contractual schemes for rare breed conservation are present in Europe, many are often poorly 66 
targeted (Kompan et al., 2014; Bojkovski et al., 2015). Targeting incentives towards small-holder and 67 
extensive farm systems may improve scheme efficiency and uptake, given their lower opportunity cost 68 
of conservation (Naidoo et al., 2006). This paper explores rare breed conservation contracts in 69 
Transylvania (Romania), where the average farm size is only 3.4 ha and the economic efficiency per 70 
farm (as measured by standard monetary output of agri-products per holding) is significantly  lower 71 
than the European Union (EU) average (Popescu et al., 2016).  72 
 73 
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Traditional farm systems in Transylvania are under pressure from development of more intensive 74 
farm systems that are changing the scale and nature of practices  (Sutcliffe et al., 2013, 2015). A focus 75 
on improved efficiency is at the expense of the supply of public goods, including breed diversity. Some 76 
42% of livestock breeds in Romania are classified as ‘at-risk’, according to the United Nations Food 77 
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) definition of an ‘at-risk’ breed (Draganescu, 2003). This figure 78 
may be an underestimate since population estimates for many Romanian breeds are unknown (FAO, 79 
2018). There is therefore a need to develop targeted policy responses that aid conservation by balancing 80 
an intensification agenda with incentives for the supply of other non-market goods and services.  81 
 82 
Farm scale  drivers of diversity loss are often assumed to relate solely to the lower productivity of 83 
traditional livestock breeds (Cicia et al., 2003). While income forgone is a key factor to establish the 84 
cost of incentive-based schemes, other factors also motivate farm business decisions, and may be 85 
particularly relevant in a semi-subsistence farming context. Such non-financial motives may include  86 
tradition, community relations, professional pride and independence (Gasson, 1973; Ilbery, 1983; 87 
Burton et al., 2008). It is therefore necessary to identify how such attributes might influence the design 88 
of conservation programmes and farmer willingness to supply diversity. Other potential technical and 89 
institutional barriers-to-entry (i.e. requirements for breed genealogical records) also warrant exploration 90 
in this context.  91 
   92 
We used a choice experiment (CE) survey to elicit farmer preferences for supplying (rare breed) 93 
conservation under alternative contracts forms. CEs are a stated preference technique where individual 94 
preferences for attributes of a good or service are elicited using surveys that mimic hypothetical 95 
scenarios – in this case conservation contracts (Louviere et al., 2000). The paper adds to the  literature 96 
on farmers’ willingness to participate in incentive-based schemes (Ducos et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 97 
2009; Broch and Vedel, 2010; Espinosa‐Goded et al., 2010; Greiner, 2015; Lienhoop and Brouwer, 98 
2015) but focuses on the neglected issue of the cost of conserving FAnGR in small-holder and extensive 99 
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farm systems. The paper aims to investigate farmer preferences for rare breed conservation contracts, 100 
including the minimum compensation required for enrolment  in a conservation scheme. We explore 101 
whether some of the heterogeneity associated with contractual choices is systematically associated with 102 
farm or farmer characteristics. 103 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background to the CE design and case study 104 
site. Section 3 reports the analysis of choice data. Section 4 provides discussion of the design of rare 105 
breed conservation programmes, and Section 5 provides conclusions.  106 
2 Methods 107 
2.1 Case study: Romania 108 
As an EU member state, Romania’s agricultural policy is structured and supported in an agreed  109 
Rural Development Programme (RDP 2014-2020), which  includes a support measure (M10.2, art 28) 110 
for rearing endangered livestock breeds under EU Regulation 1305/2013 (MARD, 2014). Uptake for 111 
this RDP option is anticipated to be low due to farmer difficulties in meeting EU standards to qualify 112 
for subsidy payments (Page, 2015, personal communication). Data on uptake rates are not yet available, 113 
but previous work has found that 70% of Romanian farmers experienced difficulties meeting EU 114 
environmental standards for payments under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Fischer et al., 115 
2012). It is therefore important to explore whether such barriers persist for farmers in small-scale and 116 
extensive systems, as this could reduce participation. Equally important is to measure whether voluntary 117 
agri-environmental stewardship (AES) measures, specifically M10.2, match farmer preferences and 118 
expectations for scheme design and rewards.      119 
 120 
Much of the study site (Figure 1) is situated in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains and features 121 
an undulating topography with low nutritional pastures (Mikulcak et al., 2013). Part of the area (Tarnava 122 
Mare) is classified as high nature value (HNV) farmland. Traditional agricultural practices are common 123 
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in this area, as is the presence of many small scale and semi-subsistence farms (Page et al., 2011). 124 
Mechanised systems are the mainstay for medium to large farms, though are much less common. The 125 
site is characterised by high levels of rural poverty, with average household incomes below the national 126 
average (Gherghinescu, 2008). 127 
 128 
We surveyed livestock keepers across 5 counties (Sibiu, Brasov, Mures, Cluj and Alba). The 129 
sampling frame was based on local farmer information held by village mayors, with further random 130 
sampling of farms. The survey was administered from June to August (2015).  131 
 132 
 133 
Figure 1: Land cover map of the survey area with inset map of Romania. Sampling locations are 134 
shown by yellow stars. 135 
2.2 Questionnaire design and administration 136 
The survey consisted of four sections. The first asked about the farm business including livestock 137 
species and breeds, farm size, and traits farmers deem most important when considering choice of breed. 138 
In the second, respondents were asked if they receive AES payments and whether they were aware of 139 
financial support for rare breeds and ever considered applying for this support. The third part of the 140 
questionnaire included the CE. Two CE versions were created - one for ovines and one for bovines. 141 
Farmers answered either one or both depending on whether they were keeping ovines, bovines, or both. 142 
After the CE tasks were completed, respondents were asked to state their motivations for their choices 143 
in the CE, and this information was used to identify genuine choices from protest bids; the latter 144 
subsequently being removed from the analysis. Respondents were also asked about their preference 145 
concerning scheme remittance (i.e. individual or community payment). The fourth section collected 146 
socio-economic information including respondent age, gender, educational attainment and household 147 
income. 148 
 7 
2.3 Choice experiment design 149 
In CEs, respondents are asked to repeatedly choose from a number of options that differ in their 150 
attributes or characteristics following an experimental design. The CE elicited individual preferences 151 
using hypothetical contract choice sets requiring farmers to upkeep rare breeds from a list of breeds 152 
proposed by the Romanian Government for support under the 2014-2020 RDP measure (see Appendix 153 
2 for list of eligible breeds). Farmers were advised that the breeding of animals must be pedigree to 154 
qualify for further subsides on offspring (i.e. non-random mating). Each choice task consisted of two 155 
alternative contracts and a ‘none’ option to embody the voluntary nature of the conservation scheme. 156 
Attributes and their levels used to describe the conservation contract were determined in a multi-stage 157 
process involving literature review, expert consultations and pilot testing. 158 
 159 
Each contract option consisted of four attributes (Table 1). The first three attributes described 160 
contract length (CL); scheme support (SS); and structure of scheme (SOS). Choice of attributes drew  161 
on empirical work suggesting their importance in AES scheme design (Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 162 
Christensen et al., 2011; Greiner, 2015). A final monetary attribute (COS) represented an annual 163 
payment to farmers (per animal) and took four different levels. The monetary attribute in local currency 164 
(Lei per year) was based on a percentage (10%, 30%, 60% and 100%) of the proposed monetary reward 165 
outlined in the RDP; the premise being that some farmers may be willing to accept (WTA) a lower 166 
reward, depending on contract design. The choice tasks were differentiated based on the livestock 167 
species.  For bovine (cattle, horses and buffalo) and ovine farmers (sheep and goats) the choice tasks 168 
were similar except for the value of the monetary attribute, which reflected the relative support normally 169 
given to different species under current RDP conditions.   170 
 171 








Coding Attribute levels  
Expected 
sign 
Contract duration 2 Effects 
- 5 years 
+ 10 years 
- 
Scheme support  2 Effects 
- Basic assistance to complete the scheme 
application form  
+ Additional advisory support throughout the 
scheme (e.g. additional training for animal 
breeding)  
+ 
Structure of scheme  2 Effects 
- Individually managed  conservation scheme  
+ Community managed conservation scheme  
- 
Subsidy  4 
Discrete - Bovines = 90; 270; 530; 890 Lei / year 
+ 
Discrete - Ovines = 5; 15; 25; 45 Lei / year 
  175 
Choice set design was optimised according to prior information on the distribution of random 176 
parameters to improve statistical efficiency - i.e. reduction in sample size needed to achieve statistical 177 
significance (Crabbe and Vandebroek, 2011). Prior information concerning the parameter coefficients 178 
was estimated from results of the pilot data that was collected in situ to ensure the attributes were 179 
relevant to participants. A D-efficient experimental design optimised for the random parameter logit 180 
(RPL) model was formulated using NGene (Metrics, 2012). The final CE comprised 16 choice sets 181 
which were blocked into 4 blocks of four choice tasks each in a bid to reduce the cognitive burden for 182 
respondents (Hensher, 2006). Figure 2 shows a typical choice task presented to respondents. 183 
Figure 2: A typical choice task shown to respondents 184 
 185 
2.4 Econometric specification of choice models 186 
Respondent choices  were modelled with reference to Lancaster's theory of value (Lancaster, 1966) 187 
and Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1973; Luce, 2005). For a general description see (Holmes et 188 
al., 2017). The multinomial logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1973) was used in the first iteration of this 189 
analysis. This assumes the random component of the utility of the alternatives is independent and 190 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). A key limitation of the MNL is that preferences for attributes of different 191 
alternatives are assumed to be homogenous across individuals. Subsequently, the RPL model  was 192 
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employed in the second iteration because the approach is more advanced and takes into account 193 
heterogeneity of the parameter values among respondents. The RPL relaxes key assumptions that 194 
constrain the use of conditional logit models, namely independence of irrelevant alternatives - iia 195 
(Hensher et al., 2005). Under a RPL specification, the utility a respondent i derives from an alternative 196 
j in each choice situation t is given by: 197 
 198 
 𝑼𝒊𝒋𝒕 =  𝜷𝒊𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝝐𝒊𝒋𝒕 ( 1) 
 199 
Where Uijt is a utility maximising individual, Xijt is a vector of observed attributes associated with 200 
each contract option (i.e. contract length, scheme support, structure of scheme and price) plus the socio-201 
economic characteristics of respondents, and εijt is the random component of the utility that is assumed 202 
to have an iid value distribution. Conditional on the individual specific parameters βi and error 203 
components εi the probability that individual i chooses alternative j in a particular choice task n is 204 
represented as: 205 
 206 
 
𝑷𝒓(𝒋|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝜷𝒊𝒕 , 𝜺𝒊𝒕) =
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝒊 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊)





   
Note, choices for bovine and ovine farmers were modelled separately to explore preference 207 
heterogeneity between both groups. The empirical model was estimated using the econometric software 208 
NLOGIT 5.0. For a full description of the model specification, see Appendix 3.  209 
3 Results  210 
3.1 Respondent characteristics  211 
A total 174 respondents were surveyed - 116 were bovine farmers and 81 were ovine farmers (note 212 
45 respondents kept both ovines and bovines). The means and standard deviation of multiple individual 213 
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specific variables is outlined in Table 2. There were later used as interaction terms in the choice model 214 
to determine significant covariates that help to explain respondent choice. The mean age of participants 215 
was from 40-49 years, with highest education levels of either secondary school or college. Fewer female 216 
respondents featured in our sample as more males are generally employed in agriculture (European 217 
Commission, 2012). Average monthly household income was  reported to be in the range of €181 to 218 
€362; lower than the national average but anticipated at the sample site (Page et al., 2011). The primary 219 
income for most farmers was EU subsides, while sale of milk and meat products were generally 220 
secondary and tertiary sources, respectively. Some 40% of farmers claimed to be farming with a rare 221 
breed from a list of ‘at risk’ breeds, while 32% were enrolled in AES measures. Only 21% of respondents 222 
were aware of RDP support for rare breeds whilst only 8% actually met the EU’s criteria to qualify for 223 
payments.  224 
 225 
Table 2: Summary of individual specific variables (with means) and relevant interpretation  226 
Variable Interpretation Mean Std. Dev National mean 
Gender 1, if male, 0 otherwise 0.83 0.91 49% malea 
Age 
Categorical (1=<20, 2=20-29, 3=30-39, 4=40-49, 5=50-





Categorical (1=secondary, 2=college, 3=degree & 
professional) 
1.58 0.61 85.6% (secondary 
or college)a 
Income 
Categorical (1=<€45, 2=€45-€90, 3=€91-€181, 4=€181-
€362, 5=€362-€678, 6=>€679) 
3.8 1.45 
€ 566b 
Size Categorical (1=1-2 ha, 2=3-6 ha, 3=7-20 ha, 4=>20 ha) 2.59 1.05 3.6 hac 
FRB 1, if farming with rare breeds, 0 otherwise 0.4 0.49 - 
CON 
1, if farmer would consider farming with rare breed in the 
future, 0 otherwise 
0.89 0.32 - 
AES 
1, if farmer is currently enrolled in an agri-environment 
scheme (AES), 0 otherwise 
0.32 0.47 - 
RDP 
1, if farmer aware of RDP support for rare breeds, 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41 - 
BEN 
Categorical (1=if farmer prefers 100% individual cash 
benefits from a conservation programme, 2=50% cash 
benefit, 50% community in-kind benefit, 3=100% 
community in-kind benefit) 
1.39 0.71 - 
REG 
1, if farmer is registering livestock in a genealogic 
register, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.27 - 
Yield 
1, if farmer is keeping cross breeds for yield 
improvement, 0 otherwise 
0.47 0.5 - 
References:  a(National Institute of Statistics, 2013) b(National Institute of Statistics, 2015) c(Popescu et al., 2016) 227 
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3.2 Farm characteristics   228 
 229 
To determine how intensification may threaten traditional farming systems and breed diversity, 230 
respondents were asked to detail how their farming practices have changed over the preceding 10 years 231 
(Figure 3). Increases to dairy cattle herd size were reported by 52% of respondents. Of the 20% of our 232 
sample that reported manual hay cutting, 74% reported this to be either stable or increasing; a clear 233 
response to EU incentives that reward small-holders for the activity. Mechanical hay cutting was 234 
reported to be increasing (67% of respondents) and some 54% of farmers also stated their sheep herd 235 
size was increasing.  236 
 237 
Figure 3: Reported change in farming practices over the last 10 years from respondents.  238 
 239 
To investigate whether willingness to participate in a (rare breed) conservation programme was 240 
linked to preferences for farm animal species, respondents were asked both livestock species kept and 241 
their interest in joining a conservation scheme. Pigs were the most frequently kept farm animal followed 242 
by cattle and sheep (Table 3). The highest number of breeds reported was for pigs, while buffalo had 243 
the least. The prevalence of breed diversity varied across species. For instance, the main breed kept for 244 
each farm species ranged from 83% (Romanian Buffalo) to 37% (Large White pig). Across the sample, 245 
89% of farmers registered interest in joining a rare breed conservation programme, of which cattle 246 
(52%) and sheep (39%) were the most popular species. Least popular species were goats (11%); horses 247 
(13%) and buffalo (14%).  Of interest is the low preference for conserving rare horse breeds given their 248 
popularity in the Romanian farming context. This may suggest rare horse breeds do not match farmer 249 
preferences for horse breed characteristics and hence are undersupplied.      250 
 251 
Table 3: Sample summary of farm animal characteristics, breed abundance and farmer interest in 252 
farming with a rare breed 253 
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Species  
Incidence of farm 




Most popular breed   
(% abundance)* 
Farmers stating interest 
in farming with rare 
breed (%) 
Sheep 61 8 Tsurcana (47%) 39 
Goats 24 4 Unknown (56%) 11 
Pigs 84 13 Large White (37%) - 
Buffalo 10 3 Romanian Buffalo (83%) 14 
Cattle 73 9 Baltata Romanesca (61%) 52 
Horses 51 8 Unknown mix (51%) 13 
* Percentage abundance was calculated as the number of farm animals in our sample that correspond to a specific breed 254 
 255 
 256 
 Livestock-keepers in different countries prefer different breed attributes. Respondents were 257 
asked to rank livestock attributes by importance for breed selection. In Figure 4 radar charts indicate 258 
different preferences between rare breed and commercial breed keepers for some attributes. Here, 259 
farmers were asked to rank multiple breed attributes in terms of importance on a 1-8 scale (1 being most 260 
important, 8 being least). The proportion of farmers selecting each attribute (for ranks 1, 2 and 3) is 261 
shown. Yield was the most important attribute for both rare breed and commercial breed keepers. 262 
Adaptability was ranked 2nd for farmers keeping rare breeds, while disease and parasitic resistance was 263 
ranked 3rd. For commercial breed keepers, yield was also ranked 2nd and adaptability 3rd. This suggests 264 
productive traits are considered most important by both farmer groups, but they differ in perceived 265 
importance of non-productive traits. This supports work suggesting rare breed adaptability 266 
characteristics play an important role within the livestock sector not matched by commercial breeds 267 




Figure 4: Radar charts showing ranked importance of livestock attributes according to farmer preference.  272 
The charts reveal the proportion (%)of farmers who chose each attribute in 1st 2nd and 3rd rank. Key, CT = 273 
cultural tradition; DPR = disease and parasitic resistance; VB = veterinary bills; MH = management and 274 
handling; PQ = product quality 275 
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3.3 Choice Models 276 
 277 
The choice models investigate whether some of the heterogeneity associated with contractual 278 
choices is systematically associated with farm or farmer characteristics. Initial results from the MNL 279 
are provided in Appendix 3 to provide an overview of the basic model estimation. Results from the 280 
more sophisticated RPL model for bovine and ovine farmers are reported separately in Table 4. Both 281 
models delivered a good statistical fit (i.e. the model is a good estimator of respondent choice) as 282 
indicated by McFadden pseudo R2 values1 of 0.33 (bovines) and 0.38 (ovines).  283 
  284 
Table 4: RPL model output of estimated marginal utilities for both ovine and bovine farmers for all 285 
CE attributes and significant covariate interaction terms  286 
Attribute  
Bovines Ovines 
Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE 
Random parameters     
[CL] Contract Length  -0.829*** 0.175 -0.984*** 0.213 
[SS] Scheme Support  0.147 0.230 0.618 0.259 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme -0.554** 0.221 1.499*** 0.466 
[COS] Subsidy 0.022*** 0.003 0.594*** 0.108 
[N0] Nothing option 1.90*** 0.516 2.301*** 0.492 
Standard deviations of random parameters  
[CL] Contract Length  0.501 0.311 0.652** 0.291 
[SS] Scheme Support  1.022*** 0.261 0.297 0.495 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme 1.689*** 0.324 1.223*** 0.279 
[COS] Subsidy 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.282 
[N0] Nothing option 1.675*** 0.358 1.112*** 0.378 
Covariates (socio-economic variables) 
COS:AES -0.981***        0.374  
COS:BEN 0.016***       0.006  
N0:AES 1.681*** 0.509   
SOS:BEN   -2.506***       0.565 
COS:AES   -0.110*        0.062 
COS:BEN   -0.188**       0.077 
                                                     
1 Note the McFadden pseudo R2 can be interpreted very much like a regression R2 value but the goodness of 
fit will always be much lower in CE modelling (typically between 0.2 to 0.4).  
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Model summary     
No of observations 464    324  
Log likelihood -344.089   -222.246 
 
Chi squared 331.345   267.409  
Prob > Chi square 0.000   0.000  
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.325     0.376  
Note: ***; ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% respectively.  SE=standard error. 
Socio-economic parameter definitions: AES (whether the respondent is enrolled in an 
agri-environment scheme), BEN (farmers with preferences for receiving either 
individual or community benefits from the scheme). 
 
 287 
The N0 (non-contract option) is positive and significant in both models meaning most farmers have 288 
preferences for the status quo option which follows economic theory (Greiner, 2015). This is perhaps 289 
because there are some variables, not included in the model, which induce farmers to prefer to not join 290 
the offered contract alternatives. The subsidy attribute is positive in both models meaning higher 291 
conservation payments increased likelihood of enrolment. Contract length (bovines and ovines) is 292 
significant and negative meaning respondents prefer a shorter contract. Scheme support was not 293 
significant for both bovine and ovine farmers. Structure of scheme was negative and significant for 294 
bovine farmers meaning they prefer individually managed conservation schemes. For ovine farmers 295 
structure of scheme is positive and significant, suggesting they prefer community managed conservation 296 
programmes.  297 
 298 
Significant standard deviations of the normally distributed coefficients indicate there is 299 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for some attributes. The standard deviations were significant for 300 
all attributes accept contract length and subsidy (bovines only) and scheme support and subsidy (ovines 301 
only).  302 
 303 
Additionally, we also tested for significant relationships between respondent preferences for 304 
different contract attributes and various individual specific covariates. The significant covariate 305 
interactions for both models are listed in Table 4. For both models, a negative, significant relationship 306 
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was obtained by interacting farmers currently enrolled in AES schemes (AES) with subsidy (COS) 307 
suggesting farmers enrolled in AES measures typically require less subsidy support. Conversely, 308 
farmers not enrolled in AES schemes demanded higher subsidy payments. The N0 interacted with AES 309 
was positive and significant suggesting farmers currently enrolled in AES schemes were more likely to 310 
select the non-contract option. Education level did not influence likelihood of enrolling into a contract 311 
and farmer age did not affect preferences for contract length (both non-significant).   312 
 313 
For bovine farmers, interacting respondents wishing to receive community benefits from the scheme 314 
(BEN) with COS was significant and positive, indicating farmers looking to receive community based 315 
(in-kind) rewards require a higher equivalent subsidy reward. For ovine farmers, interacting BEN with 316 
structure of scheme (SOS) is negative and significant meaning farmers preferring individual benefit 317 
schemes also prefer individually managed conservation programmes (i.e. consistency in our results). 318 
Interacting BEN with COS was also negative and significant suggesting ovine farmers preferring 319 
individual payment schemes are WTA lower subsidy premiums. 320 
3.4 Willingness to accept estimates 321 
For WTA estimates (Table 5) the positive value for the N0 of €167 year-1 and €7 year-1 for bovine and 322 
ovine farmers, respectively, can be interpreted as the starting value needed for farmer participation in 323 
the contractual scheme relative to the baseline contract (Christensen et al., 2011); where baseline refers 324 
to a shorter contract length, scheme application support only and an individually managed conservation 325 
breeding programme. Changing from a 5 to 10 year contract would cost around €72.8 year-1 and €3.3 year-326 
1 for bovines and ovines respectively. To move from an individual to a community managed 327 
conservation scheme would cost an additional €48.6 year-1 for bovine farmers while conversely for ovine 328 
farmers it would cost an additional €5 year-1 to enrol them in an individual scheme.  329 
 330 












[CL] Contract Length -72.8*** -33.1 to -144.7 -3.3*** -1.4 to -7.3 
[SS] Scheme Support 12.9 40.7 to -37.6 -0.2 1.4 to -2.3 
[SOS] Structure of Scheme -48.6** -8.3 to -121.8 5.0*** 6.0 to 3.1 
[COS] Subsidy - - - - 
[N0] Nothing option 166.9*** 198.3 to 109.8 7.0*** 67.6 to 5.9 
Note, ***; ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% respectively 332 
3.5 Estimating contract participation 333 
Contract participation was estimated according to different payment and contract scenarios to 334 
determine how projected uptake by farmers varied according to contract attributes.  Coefficient means 335 
from the RPL model were used for calculating probabilities under two alternative scenarios; optimal 336 
and non-optimal contracts, where optimal refers to contract attributes that meet farmer preferences 337 
elicited in the CE while ‘non-optimal’ contracts do not. For instance, for bovines this would be a 5 year 338 
contract that is individually managed. The subsidy premium took consistent values across both 339 
scenarios, ranging from 10% to 100% of remuneration offered in the RDP scheme option. This allowed 340 
exploration of how scheme uptake might vary with different contract options to gauge the importance 341 
of monetary and non-monetary attributes in farmer decision making. 342 
 343 
As expected, non-optimal contracts were estimated to receive lower participation relative to optimal 344 
contracts (Figure 5). Participation estimates ranged from 4% (€20 year-1) to 70% (€200 year-1) for bovines 345 
and 2% (€1 year-1) to 78% (€10 year-1) for ovine farmers under the non-optimal scenario. Conversely, in 346 
the optimal scenario participation estimates ranged from 38% (€20 year-1) to 97% (€200 year-1) for bovines 347 
and 71% (€1 year-1) to 99% (€10 year-1) for ovine farmers. Recalling that subsidy premiums are comparable 348 
across both contract scenarios, our estimates show the difference in participation (between the two 349 
contract scenarios) ranges from 27% to 58% for bovine farmers and 22% to 84% for ovine farmers. 350 
   351 
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We find a non-linear relationship between participation and financial reward, suggesting a one unit 352 
change in subsidy does not necessarily equate to a mirrored change in participation (i.e. there are other 353 
factors exogenous to our model influencing farmers willingness to participate). Respondents presented 354 
with optimal contract designs were much more likely to enrol in a conservation programme even at 355 
lower premiums. Ovine farmers were less likely to enrol in a contract that did not match their 356 
preferences for non-monetary attributes at lower subsidy premiums (though this was not the case with 357 
higher premiums). For both farmers groups (non-optimal contracts) there appears to be a tipping point, 358 
before which contract enrolment is relatively static.     359 
 360 
Figure 5:  Probability of contract participation according to ‘non-optimal’ and ‘optimal’ contract 361 
scenarios for different subsidy premiums (bovine and ovine farmers). ‘Optimal’ refers to contract 362 
attributes that meet the preferences of agents. 363 
 364 
4 Discussion  365 
4.1 Contract preferences  366 
Results suggest farmers demonstrate a clear willingness to participate in conservation programmes 367 
for rare breeds. Participation may be reduced by up to 84% if farmer preferences for non-financial 368 
attributes are not taken into consideration Within the model, the N0 may capture the dis-utility of 369 
enrolling in a voluntary subsidy scheme that is not linked to contract attributes, but potentially other 370 
factors not included in our model (e.g. family tradition or mistrust in authorities). It may also reflect a 371 
general reluctance to join a voluntary incentive scheme (Christensen et al., 2011). However, 372 
heterogeneity across farmers in our sample (as shown by significant standard deviation of non-random 373 
parameters) complicates interpretation of the N0.         374 
   375 
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 Farmers revealed a tendency to value flexibility in contracts as demonstrated through a 376 
preference for shorter contract durations, a common finding in similar studies (Christensen et al., 2011; 377 
Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012; Santos et al., 2015). While bovine farmers preferred individually managed 378 
conservation programmes ovine farmers preferred community managed schemes. This seems logical in 379 
post-communist Romania, which has seen a shift from collective to individual ownership rights across 380 
agriculture (Tudor and Alexandri, 2015). On the other hand an enduring communal herd grazing regime 381 
among sheep farmers may explain the alternative preference. The significance of the standard deviation 382 
for this attribute further complicates interpretation. Although scheme support for a conservation 383 
programme was not considered important by both farmer groups similar attributes were significant in 384 
other studies (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). For instance, work by Christensen et al. (2011) has shown 385 
farmers are able to place a monetary value on being released from certain administrative burdens and 386 
that the use of farm advisors for schemes might make farmers willing to accept a lower payment for 387 
enrolling in a scheme. In developing countries like Romania, where rural populations are generally less 388 
educated than the wider population (FAO, 2001) application support for schemes may in-fact be 389 
paramount to securing farmer participation.  390 
 391 
A number of covariates help explain heterogeneity in both models. We did not find that farmers 392 
keeping rare breeds were WTA less for supplying conservation services, perhaps suggesting other non-393 
monetary motives were driving their decisions regarding the contract options. Both farmer groups 394 
enrolled in AES schemes were WTA less compensation for supplying conservation services, thus 395 
providing a means for conservation agencies to target least cost service providers. However, farmers 396 
enrolled in AES schemes were also more likely not to select a contract option, suggesting overlap with 397 
existing contractual schemes may deter farmers from participating. In addition, farmers already enrolled 398 
on AES programmes are more likely to harbour pro-environmental attitudes (Heyman and Ariely, 2004) 399 
that may improve compliance with contractual schemes.  400 
 401 
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In both models community (in-kind) based support is associated with higher cost than those 402 
preferring cash based payments; implying the use of in-kind rewards will increase overall scheme cost. 403 
However, in-kind payments have been shown to be more effective than cash payments in stimulating 404 
conservation effort (Gorton et al., 2009) and may provide longer term infrastructure benefits to 405 
communities supplying public goods. In addition, Narloch et al. (2017) argue collective payments to 406 
community groups may effectively ‘crowd-in’ compliance, thus reducing monitoring costs and 407 
improving conservation outcomes. The additional costs of community schemes must therefore be 408 
weighed against (potentially) improved social and farm animal diversity outcomes. 409 
 410 
4.2 Contract participation 411 
Contract participation estimates reveal a trade-off between non-monetary attributes and financial 412 
incentives. For instance, if RDP subsidies paid € 120/ animal year-1 and € 6/ animal year-1 for bovine and 413 
ovine farmers in an ‘optimal’ contract scenario then uptake rates could be as high as 86% and 98%, 414 
respectively.  This contrasts with enrolment of just 28% and 25% for identical price premiums but with 415 
‘non-optimal’ contracts for bovine and ovine farmers, respectively. The higher uptake rates associated 416 
with ovine farmers in optimal contracts may reflect that performance differences between rare and 417 
commercial breeds are larger for bovines than ovines, though this supposition requires further evidence.  418 
 419 
These participation estimates are still well above actual participation rates of 15% for an AES 420 
scheme in Northern Italy (Defrancesco et al., 2008). Empirical work by Wossink and van Wenum, 421 
(2003) suggests participation of up to 60% might be achieved in a hypothetical Dutch field margin 422 
programme, suggesting the scheme proposed here is indeed considered attractive by farmers. However, 423 
while strategies were employed to prevent hypothetical bias (e.g. cheap talk statement) it nonetheless 424 
must be considered that the high participation rates found in our work may be exaggerated by such bias 425 
(i.e. the hypothetical nature of a CE may induce respondents to overstate their desire to enrol in a 426 
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contract option). That said, farmers in our sample were generally poorer than the national average which 427 
may be an underlying factor driving an increased desire to participate.   428 
 429 
Contrary to expectations, farm size, education level and age did not have a significant effect on 430 
participation. These findings confirm conflicting results found in the literature concerning the influence 431 
of education (Dupraz et al., 2002; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Greiner, 2015), age (Wossink and van 432 
Wenum, 2003) and farm size (Christensen et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2014) on participation in 433 
contractual conservation schemes. The hypothesis that farmers keeping rare breeds would be more 434 
likely to participate in a conservation scheme was not supported. This may be because a high number 435 
of farmers were keen to participate in the scheme, irrespective of whether they were currently farming 436 
with a rare breed. Although few studies have directly assessed farmer willingness to participate in rare 437 
breed conservation programmes, work by Pattison et al. (2007) suggests that farmers keeping rare breed 438 
pigs in Mexico were willing to participate in a community conservation breeding programme even 439 
without financial incentives.  440 
4.3 Barriers to uptake 441 
Some have been critical of RDP approaches to rural policy (Shortall, 2008; Milcu et al., 2014). This 442 
study suggests there are clear barriers to entry for smallholder farmers wishing to participate in some 443 
RDP options. This is apparent where RDP eligibility requires a minimum parcel size of 0.3 ha to be 444 
entered into agreements and a cumulative field size of 1 ha or more (Mikulcak et al., 2013). The average 445 
farm size in our sample was 3-6 ha and discussion by Page et al. (2011) stresses this is a major obstacle 446 
for small-scale farmers in Eastern Europe wishing to enrol land into incentive schemes (Gorton et al., 447 
2009). Herd or flock-book registration of livestock is a requirement to qualify for RDP support for 448 
rearing local livestock breeds in danger of extinction (MARD, 2014) yet only 8% of farmers in our 449 
sample reported having animals registered in this way revealing a major barrier-to-uptake. 450 
Implementing alternative mechanisms, or proxies, to identify the genetic merit of farm animals has been 451 
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identified as an important consideration by Pattison et al. (2007)  and novel approaches developed by 452 
Bhatia et al. (2010) may serve as a way to surpass such barriers through phenotypic identification of 453 
breeds.  454 
 455 
EU rural development policy needs be more clearly communicated. In our sample, only 21% of 456 
farmers were aware of RDP funding support for farmers rearing endangered breeds. Surveys by 457 
Mikulcak et al. (2013) suggest funding measures are often poorly communicated to small-scale farmers 458 
and local mayors in Transylvania, emphasising the importance of using local communication channels. 459 
In Transylvania, Fundatia ADEPT (a local conservation NGO) are meeting this need by helping small 460 
scale farmers through workshops on the CAP and RDP measures; developing milk collection points in 461 
local villages and facilitating cooperative bids for farm applications to AES options where, individually, 462 
farmers would be ineligible to apply (Fundatia ADEPT, 2014). These factors have culminated in better 463 
support for small-scale farm incomes in Transylvania while maintaining the high levels of public goods 464 
that arise from these production systems.   465 
5   Conclusion 466 
Farm intensification is a trend across Romania and Central and Eastern Europe (Henle et al., 2008; 467 
Popescu et al., 2016) threatening breed diversity. Sustaining this diversity makes an important 468 
contribution to the delivery of SI objectives given the high option value that arises from breed diversity, 469 
through greater adaptive capacity (Hoffmann et al., 2014). This adaptability, in addition to breed 470 
cultural heritage, is considered important by farmers in Transylvania, particularly those keeping rare 471 
breeds.  472 
 473 
This analysis supports the findings of other work (e.g. Greiner, 2015; Permadi et al., 2018) that 474 
suggest contract length and the structure of schemes, in addition to monetary rewards, are important 475 
determinants of participation rates in conservation programmes. But we also acknowledge that the 476 
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monetary values farmers place on accepting specific contractual schemes are case specific (Christensen 477 
et al., 2011). As a consequence, the robustness of these results needs to be addressed in further work 478 
exploring cost-effectiveness of FAnGR conservation programmes in similar contexts. Moreover, this 479 
work has not explored how farmer WTA a contract might vary depending on breed options as part of 480 
the scheme. Indeed, work by Zander and Drucker, (2008) suggests farmer do possess heterogeneous 481 
preferences for breed attributes and breeds themselves. Exploring the importance of alternative breed 482 
and attribute combinations in contracts appears warranted and may further affect farmer willingness to 483 
participate in schemes and their WTA a conservation contract.  484 
 485 
We found that the average bovine farmer (in Transylvania) needs to be paid €122 per annum per 486 
animal extra in order to enrol in a 10 year community managed conservation contract. For ovines, an 487 
additional price incentive of €8.3 would be required for farmers to enrol in a 10 year individually 488 
managed conservation contract. A key question is whether the conservation and genetic diversity benefit 489 
of a longer contract that either includes a collectively or individually managed conservation breeding 490 
scheme will exceed the additional costs.  491 
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